We present a proof-theoretic foundation for automated deduction in linear logic. At rst, we systematically study the permutability properties of the inference rules in this logical framework and exploit these to introduce an appropriate notion of forward and backward movement of an inference in a proof. Then we discuss the naturally-arising question of the redundancy reduction and investigate the possibilities of proof normalization which depend on the proof search strategy and the fragment we consider. Thus, we can de ne the concept of normal proof that might be the basis of works about automatic proof construction and design of logic programming languages based on linear logic.
Introduction
Linear logic is a powerful and expressive logic with connections to a variety of topics in computer science. We are mainly interested by the signi cance it may have in di erent domains as logic programming or program synthesis through theorem proving. As a matter of fact, classical linear logic (denoted CLL) is a logic of actions introducing notions like controlled and strict resource management 12, 13] . It disallows both weakening and contraction in general although they are introduced for local use through modalities and it conserves a constructive character with a deep symmetry. Linear logic can be an appropriate framework to study logic programming (better than intuitionistic or classical logic) 3, 6, 16] , concurrent aspects in logic programming 4, 18] , Petri nets reachability 24]. The main point is the resource-sensitive aspect of this logic used, for example, for functional programming 19] . In previous works, we considered the synthesis of correct programs using a theorem proving approach in constructive logics with extraction of programs from proofs 8, 9] . Based on intuitionistic logics , they can present some limits due to the non-symmetrical character of such logics. But we could try to consider this approach in linear logic through an appropriate -calculus as logical language 1, 20] . In fact, the rst point is to understand what a proof or a proof net is, in some fragments of linear logic, and also to be able to construct proofs of linear logic formulas. Hence, a theorem prover in linear logic can be a rst step towards some e ective applications of CLL based on the development of proofs like logic programming. For e ciency reasons, the construction of a linear logic prover imposes of course restrictions to an adequate fragment of CLL. Some recent works have been devoted to this important topic 14, 16] . Starting from the fragment of linear Horn clauses, they try to extend it in various following ways. The di culty is then to extend the expressiveness of the language and to keep, at the same time, the e ciency of the initial kernel. Concerning e ciency criteria, we noticed that these works had a common point: the necessity to normalize, as much as possible, the proofs in these fragments, using some properties about inference permutability. Aiming also to extend logic programming, 2] has chosen another approach that consists in, starting from full linear logic, searching for equivalence between proofs in order to normalize them with the central notions of invertibility and focusing. In 27], we have a study about proof search strategies in CLL for a bottom-up direction with the same notions and also for a top-down direction based on speci c resolution method. Even if, it is not the central point, permutability properties appears in these approaches. It is a classical concept in works on the conception of e cient proof search methods in non-classical logics 26, 29] . Thus, our approach begins with a systematical study of the inference permutability possibilities in full linear logic aiming to e cient proof construction mechanization. A rst attempt in this direction has been developed in 10] where we have focused on the additive and multiplicative fragment of CLL and proposed an algorithm for automated deduction in this fragment. In this paper we completely re ne the permutability notion and we extend the approach to full linear logic. Thus, after having systematically studied, the inference permutability properties, we de ne speci c movements of inference in a proof and we analyze the redundancy reduction in a proof. Then, we are able to propose new proof forms (called normal proofs) that de ne complete and tractable proof subclasses and we discuss its interest for proof construction. Compared to other approaches on bottom-up and top-down theorem proving, we mainly focus on logical bases through a complete study of the inference permutabilities that could justify further choices of some fragments of CLL adequate for applications as logic programming. From this point, we should be in a position to study more seriously, in further work, the linear logic as a good framework for automated deduction, logic programming and also for the programming with proofs approach. We present in section 2 the linear logic framework (language and inference system) and recall some basic de nitions. Section 3 shows a complete study of the permutability properties of inferences and, in section 4, we deal with the notion of movement of an inference in a proof. Section 5 presents how to reduce some redundancies in a proof by appropriate reduction and by cut elimination. Section 6 de nes the notion of normal proof and to use it for the mechanization of proof construction in CLL in an adapted interpretor. In section 7, we emphasize the importance of this approach for designing logic programming languages in adequate fragments of linear logic. Finally, in section 8, we discuss the connections with related works in di erent fragments of CLL and then we conclude on the usefulness of these results for application embedding linear logic proofs development.
Linear logic
Classical linear logic (CLL) has been introduced by Girard 12] as a logic of actions. Born from the semantics of second order lambda-calculus, linear logic is more expressive than traditional logics (classical or intuitionistic ones). Compared to classical logic, two structural rules weakening and contraction are dropped from the Gentzen-type rules and thus we obtain a system where each resource (hypothesis) must be used exactly once. Thus, conjunction and disjunction, that allow resource sharing, are split into a multiplicative version ( ; }) disallowing resource sharing and an additive version (&; ) requiring resource sharing. To restore power of classical logic two modal operators ! and ? are introduced knowing that !F allows unlimited consumption of F and ?F allows unlimited use of F. Moreover, the logical constants true, false are split into four constants 1, ?, 0 and > and an involutive negation (denoted (:) ? ) is introduced.
Characterized by the absence of structural rules and by a speci c treatment of the negation, CLL has proofs that can be considered as actions and introduces a dynamical resource management in these proofs without directional character (no distinction between input and output). We refer the reader to 12, 13, 25, 28] for a broad explanation of the purpose and the meaning of linear logic.
The language
The language consists of a) a set of nite terms Term V ] on a countable set of variables V , b) a countable set of atoms At each having an arity. It allows to construct a set Atom of atomic formulas: if n is the arity of the atom a and t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n 2 Term V ] then a(t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ) is an atomic formula, c) a set of logical operators Op = f0; 1; ?; >; () ? Here we manipulate sequents without left-hand sides, using the following notation conventions: variables 2 V will be referred by the letters u; x; y; z, terms 2 Term V ] by the letters r; s; t, atoms 2 At by the letters a; b; c, atomic formulas 2 Atom by the letters A; B; C, formulas 2 Form by the letters F; G; H, multisets of formulas 2 Form by the letters ?; . Moreover, the letters can possibly be indexed by integers.
The linear sequent calculus
The inference system we use is the classical linear sequent calculus 12]. Let us recall that a sequent`F 1 ; :::; F n is a nite multiset of formulas of Form. Thus, we implicitly take into account the exchange rule and consider the commutative linear logic. We present now the inference rules of the linear sequent calculus. Remark 2.1 If we consider full linear logic, it is equivalent to work with sequents without lefthand side part (system called CLL) or with left-hand side part (system called CLL'). It is due to the property of the linear negation that allows to move a formula from one side to the other in a sequent, by changing it into its negation. We have chosen to work in CLL for simpli cation purposes but, for applications as logic programming, CLL' presents some advantages: for example, it can be restricted without di culty to a fragment of linear logic without negation. As a matter of fact, the translation of the results for CLL in CLL' can be easily performed.
Derivations in CLL
Before proceeding further in our study, it is necessary to x some vocabulary relatively to the notion of derivation and proof in CLL. Let us recall that an inference is an instance of a rule of the system de ned above and the type of an inference I is the name of the corresponding rule, that is denoted by type(I)
In a derivation, it will be necessary to follow the evolution of the formulas from the time when they are introduced (called principal) to the time when they are used, disappearing or becoming subformulas (called active). To take into account this evolution, it will be necessary to mark them in the derivations. We thus give the following de nitions.
2.3.1 Principal and active formulas, contexts De nition 2.1 A principal formula of an inference I, such that type(I) 6 = c?, is a formula of the conclusion that did not exist in the premises.
If type(I) = c? the principal formula is the result of the contraction of the two formulas in the premise. We can classify the inference rules in two categories: the ones depending on the context of the premises (those of the &, ! or 8 type) and the others. It is due to the fact that the application of the rules &, ! or 8 is possible under some conditions on the premise contexts. For &, the contexts of the two premises have to be identical, for ! the context of the premise has to be of the form ? and for 8 the variable y associated to the inference cannot be free in the premise context.
Marked derivations and proofs
We use the classical representation with binary trees labelled with sequents for de ning the notions of derivation (or deduction) and proof 7] . Let us recall some de nitions.
De nition 2.6 (i) An hypothesis of a derivation is a sequent labelling one of its leaves.
(ii) An intermediate conclusion is a sequent that is not an hypothesis (i.e, not labelling a leave). (iii) The conclusion of a derivation is the sequent labelling the root of this tree. (iv) A proof in CLL is a derivation without hypotheses. (v) A sequent` is provable if there exists a proof with` as conclusion.
It appears important to be able to follow the evolution of a formula in a proof and to do that we consider the marking of each of its inferences.
De nition 2.7 A marked inference is an inference with a function from the premises to the conclusion, that allows to identify formulas in the premises with formulas or sub-formulas in the conclusion. A marked proof is a proof where each inference is marked. Hence, after this presentation of the logical framework we consider, we can now focus on the rst important notion that is the permutability of inferences in a proof.
Inference permutability
We take as our point of conceptual departure the notion of inference permutability in full linear logic. It is a basic notion that appears to be very important for an e cient proof search (and theorem proving) in non-classical logics 26, 29] . We want to systematically study the possibilities we can obtain, from a given proof in CLL, other proofs by a simple permutation of two inferences that are consecutive in the proof tree.
As an example, we take a proof where an inference of type & immediately precedes an inference of type 1 . Let us consider the proof : The operation of permutation of two inferences in a proof implies (because of its involutive character) an equivalence relation between proofs.
De nition 3.4 Let and 0 be two proofs of CLL, 0 is equivalent to modulo an inference permutation (denoted by 0 ) if there exists two inferences I 1 and I 2 in such that 0 is obtained by permutation of I 1 with I 2 in .
De nition 3.5 Let and 0 two proofs of CLL, 0 is equivalent to modulo the inference order (denoted 0 ) if there exists a nite sequence 1 ; :::; n of n proofs in CLL (n 1) such that (i) 1 and n 0 , (ii) for i 2 such a movement is an inference introducing the active formula of the other (the inferences are no more in permutation position). This double analysis leads us to classify the inference types into two groups: the ones we can move backward and the others we can move forward as far as possible, in a proof. Now, we will study now in details these possible contradictory movements in a proof in full linear logic.
Inference movement in a LL proof
In this section, we de ne the notion of movement of an inference in a proof. We are mainly interested by movements on an inference towards the top of the proof (called backward or up movement) and towards the bottom of the proof (called forward or down movement).
Backward movement
Intuitively, it is an iteration of the movement of backward permutation of an inference in a proof. We observe that the inference w? get over an inference of type & by backward movement in 0 , with its duplication as main e ect and then the inference set of 3 resulting of the movement of w? consists of two inferences w?.
Let us consider again the array of theorem 3.2, line by line, to see which inference types are well adapted to the backward movement. After a rst analysis, it seems to be cut; ; ; ?; w?; 9; ?, but the last one can also be adequate for forward movement, as we will notice it after. Concerning the inference of type w?, by the theorem 3.2, there is no problem for backward movement of such inference. Moreover, it does not need an active formula and it is always in permutation position with the inferences that precede it immediately. So we can move it backward up to the axioms. This is illustrated by the above example and expressed by the following theorem Let us assume the property true for a height h ( 1) and prove it for h + 1.
Let us consider a proof and an inference I of of w? type such that the subproof tree 1 ,
having the premise of I as root, is of height h+1, the inference I 1 that immediately precedes I in , is not an axiom because h + 1 2. Moreover, I has no active formula and then I 1 is in permutation position with I and is permutable with it by theorem 3.2.
1) type(I 1 ) 6 = & Let 00 be the proof obtained by permutation of I 1 with I in and I 00 the inference of 00 corresponding to I, the subproof tree 00 1 of 00 , having I 00 as root, has the height h and thus we can apply the induction hypothesis to it.
Then, there exists a proof 0 obtained by backward movement of I 00 in 00 such that any inference I 0 of 0 , resulting from this movement, is immediately preceded by an axiom.
By the composition of this backward movement with the permutation that transforms into 0 , we obtain a backward movement that leads from to 0 . Thus, the property is true for h+1.
2) type(I 1 ) = &
This case is similar to the previous one except that I is split by the permutation into two inferences I 00 and J 00 and thus we have to apply the induction hypothesis twice.
Concerning the type ?, the only di erence with the previous one is that each inference of the ? type contains an active formula and its backward movement is stopped by the inferences introducing this active formula. We have the following result Apparently, by theorem 3.2, the backward movement of a cut inference can be hold up by an inference of type !. But, as shown by the example below, this problem can be solved and the cut inference has the same behavior than the ? inference and consequently it leads to an analogous result. At this time, the movement stops because the cut inference is no longer in permutation position with its immediate predecessors.
Theorem 4.3 (backward movement of cut)
Let be a proof in LL and I an inference of of the cut type, there exists a proof 0 obtained by backward movement of I in such that for any inference I' of 0 resulting of this movement, the inferences preceding immediately I' introduce its active formulas. Proof 4.3 By induction on the number n of inferences preceding I in . n = 0. There is no proof where I is not preceded by an inference and thus the property is true.
Let us assume the property true until any order n and prove that it is true for n+1.
Let us consider a proof and I an inference of type cut preceded by n+1 inferences in , 1) One inference immediately preceding I is not of the ! type and does not introduce an active formula of I.
Let I 1 such an inference, by theorem 3.2, we can permute I 1 with I to obtain a proof 00 where the inferences corresponding to I are preceded by n inferences. Thus, we can apply the induction hypothesis and we obtain by backward movement of these inferences in 00 a proof 0 verifying the given criteria. By composition of these movements with the permutation leading from to 00 we obtain a backward movement from to 0 .
2) The inferences immediately preceding I are of type ! or introduce an active formula of I. 2.1) The inferences immediately preceding I introduce the active formulas of I. In this case the proof 0 we search is . Concerning the types , and 9, the potential obstacle of the inferences of type ! cannot be bypassed as for the cuts. This point is illustrated in the following example. It is also possible to move backward (or up) the inferences of ! type in a proof. But, taking into account the particular behaviour of the ! rule, this movement is not possible by successive permutations but only possibly by jumps from an intermediate conclusion of the form`F; ? to another one of the form`F; ? 0 , if we do not have & in the fragment we consider.
Forward movement
Intuitively, it is an iteration of the forward movement of an inference that permutes with another in a proof. This movement can be complicated by the meeting, during this process, of an inference of type & with a contrary e ect as for backward movement. Then, by such a movement, the inference is not duplicated but merged with another one that provides from the other branch of the proof tree. Thus, starting from a set of inferences, we terminate the movement with only one inference. That is the reason why the forward movement notion is de ned by duality from the backward movement. We can restrict this proof to a proof where the principal formula of I is not active afterwards (it is then in the conclusion of ) without loosing generality.
Let us denote I l the last inference of . 1) I I l The proof 0 is equal to .
2) I 6 I l 2.1) type(I l ) 6 = &. We apply the induction hypothesis to the subproof 1 of the premise of I l that contains the principal formula of I.
By forward movement of I in 1 we obtain a proof 0 1 ending with an inference I 0 1 resulting of this movement.
Let us replace 1 by 0 1 in , by theorem 3.2, I 0 1 is permutable with I l and we obtain the proof 0 through this permutation.
2.2) type(I l ) = &.
Let F be the principal formula of I, has the following form: In this case, I and J have the same type and we apply the induction hypothesis to 1 with I and to 2 with J. By forward movement of I in 1 we obtain a proof 0 1 ending with an inference I 1 resulting from this movement. In the same way, by forward movement of J in 2 we obtain a proof 0 2 ending with an inference J 1 resulting from this movement. By replacing 1 and 2 by 0 1 and 0 2 respectively in and then by permutation of I 1 with I l we obtain the proof 0 .
) F ?F 0 .
In this case, we apply the induction hypothesis on 1 If a sequent of the form`!F; ? is provable then there exists a proof of this sequent which ends with the inference introducing !F.
Proof 4.6 If a sequent of the form`!F; ? is provable and is a proof of it, we can modify it in the following way. At rst, we replace, by starting from the nal conclusion in all intermediate conclusions, the formula !F by F to the inferences which introduce it and we delete these inferences. Next, we add the following inference`F ; ? `!F; ? at the end of the proof.
It is clear that the resulting tree is de nitely the proof we search.
A consequence of this theorem is a possibility of forward jump of ! in a proof.
Remark 4.2 If we consider the inference types, we observe that we have di erent groups of inferences with respect to the permutability properties and the movement of an inference in a proof. We have two principal groups of inference types that are the ones to move down and the ones to move up. Let us remark that the partition between the both groups depends on the proof search direction (bottom-up or top-down) we choose, as we will see in section 6. Moreover, they correspond to the groups of connectives obtained by partition in 2] with respect to a notion of synchronization and determinism. But there are di erences concerning the treatment of ? and !. The connective ?, considered as asynchronous by Andreoli 2] , corresponds in our work to the three rules c?, w? and ? that behave di erently. ! that is member of the group of synchronous connectives is moved forward in our work. Our own classi cation is based only on permutability properties in the framework and on their logical consequences. That is the reason why we do not tell about the constants 0, 1 and > that are produced by axioms.
Redundancy reduction
The study of the forward and backward movement in the CLL proofs provides through the previous results and theorems tools to order the inferences inside a proof with a If, from a given proof, it is easy to construct an equivalent one which is not redundant, it is more di cult to construct directly, from a given sequent, a non-redundant proof (without needing to check it a posteriori).
Cut elimination
The cut rule is one of the reasons for redundancy. If the theorem 4.3. motivates the backward movement of cut inferences in a proof then it does not eliminate them. Let us consider this result on cut elimination as an extension of this theorem. Considering a proof of CLL, a cut can be moved backward up to the inferences introducing its active formulae. These ones have dual types and then we can move it again of one step. After this, we can apply again the theorem and so on... But how can we be sure that this process terminates ? Neither the height of the successive proofs nor the inference number decreases systematically during this process. Thus it is necessary to de ne an appropriate new decreasing function presented below, which is possible with the notion of complexity of cuts in a proof. Until now, these de nitions do not present di culties, but the next one is more subtle. If we de ne the complexity of the cuts in a proof as the maximum of the complexity of its di erent cuts, it can be very di cult to prove that we can decrease this complexity. The reduction of the complexity of a particular cut could imply the increasing of another cut, being above. That motivates the following de nition
Complexity of cuts in a proof
De nition 5.4 (cuts complexity in a proof)
Let be a CLL proof, the complexity of the cuts of is the integer c( ) that is equal to zero if has no cuts and to the maximum of the complexities of cuts that are not preceded by another one.
Cut elimination Theorem 5.1 (complexity reduction)
Let be a proof in CLL of a sequent` with only one cut, there exists a proof 0 of` such that c( 0 ) < c( ).
Proof 5.1 The complete proof is given in appendix B.
The cut elimination theorem is a direct consequence of the theorem 5.1, but its proof uses a particular strategy of cut reduction and thus our theorem is a theorem of weak normalization knowing that strong normalization is veri ed for linear logic 12].
Theorem 5.2 (cut elimination)
If` is a provable sequent of CLL then there exists a proof of` without cuts.
Proof 5.2 Let be a proof of CLL, for n 2 0; c( )] we have the property P(n): there exists a proof n with the same conclusion as such that c( n ) = c( ) ? n.
This property is an immediate consequence of the theorem 5.2. It is su cient then to apply P(c( )).
Theorem 5.3 (of subformula)
Let be a CLL proof without cuts and` its conclusion, for any intermediate conclusion` 0 of , a formula of` 0 is a subformula of` .
Proof 5.3 By induction on h, height of` 0 in . h = 0. In this case` 0 is` and the property is true. Let us assume the property true for any order h and show that it is true for h+1. Let` 0 be an intermediate conclusion of being at the height h+1, it is a premise of an inference I the conclusion of which is at height h.
Let F be a formula of` 0 , I is not a cut and then there exists a formula F 0 of a sequent` 00 such that F is a subformula of F 0 (extending the subformula notion for 9 and 8).
00 being at height h in , the induction hypothesis is applied to it and F 0 is a subformula of a formula F 00 of` . Then, by transitivity, we deduce that F is a subformula of F 00 .
Let us recall that this theorem of sub-formula is naturally the basis of proof search methods in bottom-up approaches but also in top-down approaches.
Weakening and contraction reduction
The cuts often generate redundancy in a proof but it is not the only reason. Let us assume that we have the result for any proof tree with height h et prove it for h+1. Let be such a proof tree, if it is under weakening and contraction reduction we have the expected result, if not it contains an intermediate conclusion` 1 of the form`?F; ?F; that does not verify the condition (i) and (ii) of de nition 5.5.
) does not verify the condition (i). We suppress in the weakening the conclusion of which is` 1 and all contractions introducing one of the formulae ?F and we add ?F to intermediate conclusions situated between them. Thus, we obtain a proof 00 of height h-1 with the same conclusion as and we can apply the induction hypothesis to it. ) does not verify the condition (ii). We use the same proof schema as in . This proof is redundant and without cuts. It is even under weakening and contraction reduction. That shows that we have not exhausted the subject of redundancies elimination in the proofs.
Proof normalization
From the previous results about the permutability of inferences, the movements of an inference in a proof and the treatment to reduce some redundancies, we aim to analyze the possibilities of reducing the non-determinism of the proof search process. In this section, we study the proof normalization depending on the strategy we use for proof construction. We will see in a next section that it might depend also from the fragment of CLL we consider. Thus, we are able to de ne the notion of normal proof that is a special form of proof with certain constraints on the order in which the inference rules must be applied. It is a way to consider the mechanization of proof construction in full linear logic, these normal proofs constituting a complete subset of proofs in CLL. But it would be necessary, in further work, to consider in addition semantical properties to improve new strategies for theorem proving in CLL.
Normalization and construction strategy
Undependently of the construction strategy, the possibility to construct proofs without cuts is essential. For a top-down proof search, it allows an goal-oriented procedure because of the sub-formula property and for a bottom-up proof search we have a decomposition process of the formulas of the sequent to prove. The theorems about the inference movements lead to a relative ordering of the inferences in a proof. Considering a proof as an object, the normalization corresponds to a double movement: maximum up or down movements of certain inferences in a proof. Considering a proof more as a process (being interested by the construction), the normalization corresponds to the application as soon as possible of certain inferences and as late as possible of other inferences. The theorems of section 4 help us to determinate a rst criterion to choose the inferences to move backward (up) or forward (down): the facility to do it. For example, theorem 4.5. allows to immediately decompose a formula having & is principal connector when it appears in a goal during a bottom-up proof search. In the contrary, for a top down search, the application of the & rule is done as late as possible. But this criterion about facility is the not the only one. Another one consists of the proof strategy we have chosen (bottom-up or top-down). Thus, for top-down search, we have to move up the inferences that are easy to control from the premises and to move down at maximum the others. For a bottom-up, we have to move down the inferences that are easy to control from the conclusion and to move up at maximum the others.
For instance, if we consider the weakening rule w?, we observe that it is not controllable from the premise and from the conclusion. Thus, we have to apply this rule as late as possible for top-down and bottom-up proof directions.
The analysis for the contraction rule c? is di erent because it is not controllable from the conclusion but more easier from the premise. Thus, we have to apply the rule as soon as possible for a top-down strategy and as late as possible for a bottom-up strategy. This rule is easily derivable from the initial rule and is also complete and it is easy to prove that the sequent modi ed calculus with 0 preserves completeness 27]. Thus, from now, we consider this new version of the sequent calculus. When we have xed the direction of an inference movement in a proof, we have to known until where this movement is possible. The general answer is simple: in the proof (as object) the inferences will be moved up until the inferences where the active formulas are introduced and moved down until the inferences where their principal formulas become active. That are consequences of the results in section 4. Moreover, we have to consider the coherence of these movements. To be more concrete, we want now consider the bottom-up construction of proof in CLL, aiming the analysis the non-determinism forms and their reasons and the reduction possibilities due to the normalization. A similar and dual study might be done for CLL and the top-down proof strategy.
Normalization and non-determinism reduction
Let us consider a sequent` to prove in CLL, a bottom-up proof search consists in building the proof tree from the conclusion to the axioms. The process is a construction of a sequence of goal expansions, an expansion of a goal` 0 consisting in replacing it by the premises of an inference that has` 0 as conclusion. During each step, there are three fundamental selection choice points where we have non determinism: the choice of a goal (to satisfy), the choice of a principal formula in a goal and nally, from a given goal and a principal formula, the choice of an inference with this goal as conclusion and this formula as the principal one. a) The choice of a goal. The non-determinism concerning this choice is a "don't care" non-determinism in the sense that whatever the goal we choose, the result does not change as its form. It is true for normal proofs or not. But the choice has consequences on time and space resources used to determine the goal. The study about permutability of inferences in a proof and the resulting theorem 3.2 can help us to elaborate some strategies. A sequent is often an element of a particular fragment of CLL and the permutation of inferences (and then the normalization) can be done more e ciently depending on the sort of fragments. Then it is pertinent to consider the goals being in fragments where we expect good normalization properties. Other considerations, from a semantical point of view, can help to re ne the goal choice. For example, a goal being in the multiplicative fragment of CLL is interesting because we can apply the duality property 11] to it. b) The choice of a principal formula. This choice concerns partially a "don't know" non-determinism and a "don't care" non-determinism. The proof normalization will allow to reduce it directly.
if the goal has the form`!F; ? 0 then theorem 4.6 allows us to surely choose !F as principal formula of an inference of ! type and to replace the current goal by`F; ? 0 .
if the goal includes a formula having }; &; 8; ? as principal connective then we can surely choose it as principal formula of the next inference that will reduce the goal (theorem 4.5). if the goal does not have the previous forms and if it contains formulas that are not literals, the choice of the principal formula corresponds to a "don't know" non-determinism. But when we x the principal formula F, we determinate the principal formula of the inferences that immediately follow. If F has ; ; 9 as principal operator, we can surely choose its components, when they are not positive literals or not of the form ?G, as principal formulas of the inferences that immediately follow (theorem 4.4).
If F has the form ?G, it can be produced by three di erent rules c?, w?, and ?. We surely choose an inference of w? type if the goal can be proved by an axiom followed by a sequence of weakenings (theorem 4.1). Else, if F is produced by the ? rule, by theorem 4.2. we can choose the active formula as principal formula of the next inference and if F is produced by the c? rule, one of the two active formulas is the principal formula of the inference that immediately follows. if the goal has only literals, it is either not provable or it is the conclusion of an axiom.
c) The choice of an inference Having a principal formula, its external connective determines the inference rule to realize the expansion of the proof tree, except in the case of ? and also for which we have two possibilities. The choice between 1 and 2 corresponds to a "don't know" non-determinism that is di cult to reduce. The rule being xed, it does not mean that the corresponding inference is completely xed. It is true in general, except for 9 and . For 9, we have to choose the term associated to the inference. For , we have to split the context into two parts that is an important source of "don't know" non-determinism di cult to reduce. In the both cases we can postpone the choice at the level of axioms by using lazy methods. To summarize, the search of a normal proof imposes constraints to the general algorithm for the choice of the principal formula, that reduce signi cantly the "don't know" non-determinism of it. Moreover, it could help us to elaborate speci c tactics and strategies for the choice of the goal to prove. But it does provide mechanisms for calculating expansions when they are not determined by the principal formula. Thus, normal proofs provide logical foundations for the proof search for a given sequent.
Normal proofs
To the normalization of proofs considered as processes, corresponds a normalization of the proofs considered as objects. For the full linear logic and for the bottom-up proof search direction, we can now de ne the notion of normal proof.
Let us begin to introduce this de nition, by considering T # and T " the sets of if` has the form`!F; ? 0 then it is the immediate conclusion of an inference of ! type else if` contains a formula introduced by an inference of type 2 T # then it is the immediate conclusion of an inference of type 2 T # else if` contains a formula introduced by an inference of type 2 T " n f?; c?; w?g then for each premise which is not`!F; ? 0 , the active formula , if it is not a positive literal, is the principal formula of the preceding inference.
else if` has a formule ?F as principal formula then we have three possible cases (1)` is the conclusion of a w? rule and the preceding inferences are weakenings or axioms.
(2)` is the conclusion of a c? rule and the preceding inference is an inference of type ? introducing one of the active formulas of the inference ending with` (3)` is the conclusion of an inference of ? type and the active formula, if it is not a positive literal, is the principal formula of the preceding conclusion.
An intermediate conclusion which veri es this criterion is said normal. We present now the proof normalization theorem, the proof of which gives us a procedure for the transformation and normalization of given proofs.
Theorem 6.1 (normalization theorem)
For any proof of CLL there exists a normal proof n of LL with the same conclusion Proof 6.1 Let us call a quasi-normal proof a proof that veri es all normality criteria of the de nition 6.1 except possibly (ii). According to theorem 5.4, it is su cient to prove that, for any CLL proof there exists a quasinormal proof with the same conclusion. Let be a CLL proof, according to theorem 5.2, we can also suppose without cuts. In order to normalize it, we can choose between di erent strategies. We can, for example, start with the forward movement of all concerned inferences and then move backward all the others. Of course, we must proceed methodically and carefully because every new movement does not have to destroy what has been realized before. Then, we proceed by structural induction on . 1) is an axiom. In this case, is obviously normal and is the proof we search.
2) is not an axiom. Let I be the last inference of . By the induction hypothesis, we can replace the subproofs of the I premises by quasi-normal proofs in . We obtain in this way a proof 0 which is not necessarily quasi-normal. The conclusion` of I is not always a normal intermediate conclusion of 0 . It depends on the type of I.
2.1) type(I) =!
It is immediate that` is normal in 0 .
2.2) type(I) 2 T #
Then` is not of the form`!F; ? 0 and therefore it is normal in 0 .
2.3) type(I) 2 T " n f?; w?; c?g
According to the theorem 4.4, there exists a proof 00 , obtained by backward movement of I in 0 , such that every inference I' of 00 resulting from this movement is immediately preceded by an inference which introduces the active formula of I' (if its top connective is not ?). This operation preserves the normality of the modi ed intermediate conclusions, except possibly the conclusions of the inferences I'. They can contain formulas which have been introduced by inferences of type 2 T # . But we can modify this feature using theorem 4.5 which allow, for every inference I', to move forward the problematic inferences just after I'. The proof we obtain is then quasi-normal.
2.4) type(I) 2 f?; w?; c?g
We use the same process as in 2.3) but with variants due to particularities of these types. In its backward movement, I cannot be stopped by an inference of ! type and according to the theorem 4.1, I can be moved just after axioms if it is of w? type.
Remark 6.1 The concept of normal proof, because of its static character, does not emphasize the essential di erence between the inferences of type }; &; 8; > and the ones of type ; ; 9; ?.
The rst ones are completely concerned by a "don't care" non-determinism and the second ones are partially concerned by a "don't know" non-determinism. Remark 6.2 Moreover, the existence of a part of "don't care" non-determinism leads to di erent normal proofs for a given sequent, each being equivalent modulo inference permutations. A possibility for handling this speci c case of inference permutation could be to investigate a notion of proof net and proof net normalization. Proof net is a concept in proof theory rstly introduced by Girard for the multiplicative fragment of linear logic 12] from the fact that the sequential presentation of proofs with trees is inadequate and does not emphasize their meaning.
In 11], we have investigated automatic proof net construction but the point is to be able to extend this notion to more important fragments of CLL 5] through a new appropriate representation and de nition of proof nets. Having it, it would be interesting to apply the previous results on normalization directly on this concept with a view to reducing not useful redundancies.
As in 16] where the uniform proof notion is essential for proof construction, we have with the normal proof concept the possibility to found systems dependent from proof search in CLL on this concept de ning sub-classes of proofs that are complete and tractable. It is important to note that this notion depends on the fragment we consider and also on the proof construction direction (bottom-up or top-down). In a general way, if we want to build normal proofs in CLL it is necessary to x some constraints about choices, as mentioned above, with e ect to mainly reduce non-determinism sources.
Application to linear logic programming
Until now, we have considered full linear logic and normalization aims to improve the e ciency of proof construction in a theorem prover for linear logic. Such a prover could be considered as a starting point for a based-on-linear-logic interpretor of logic programming. But it seems necessary to restrict the study to some fragments of CLL for e ciency purposes. Thus a crucial question arises: how can we determine an appropriate fragment ? . A rst point to answer this question is to know the type of problems we want to specify with the help of linear logic. Commonly, it is well adapted to the speci cation of dynamic problems where where X represents a positive literal, C a de nite clause and G a goal. Let us remark that here, we have translated a given logical framework to obtain the previous grammar about clauses and goals. That is because we have chosen standard Prolog as starting point, but a normal approach is to give directly such a grammar and to begin the study with it.
2) A second step consists in de ning the CLL fragment involved by this sequent form. Thus, according to the subformula property we can deduce, from the previous syntax, the set of inference rules of CLL that will be concerned to prove the linear sequents deduced by the rst step. For our example, this set of rules is R 0 = f | L ; & R ; ! L ; w! L ; c! L ; 8 L ; 9 R g and we have now determinated the logical fragment (denoted LF 0 ).
3) A third step consists in studying the logical foundations of this fragment, i.e., permutability properties in order to de ne proof search procedures. Let us remark that our results work on sequents without left-hand side part but we can transpose them without di culty for application to classical sequents. The study of inference permutability, according to theorem 3.2, leads to the following results for LF 0 , summarized in the array below.
A fourth step consists in studying the possible inference movements in LF 0 . To do that, we have rst to x a direction for proof strategy, i.e, bottom-up or top down, and according to our example, we choose a bottom-up proof search strategy and try to order inferences as in the general case presented section 4.
For LF 0 , the inferences of type & R and 9 R can be moved forward (or down) as far as possible in a proof and the inferences of type | L , ! L , w! L and c! L can be moved forward (or up) as far as possible. Let us remark that 8 L can be moved up or down and we decide here to move it backward.
5) A fth step consists in de ning, through inferences ordering, the form of bottom-up proof we can construct.
From the previous step, a bottom-up proof will begin with the application of the 9 R and & R rules for decomposing the goal into subgoals.
Then, we will apply the ! L or c! L rules that correspond to the choice of a clause in a program. We know that it is moved up at maximum and thus the active formula X is also the principal formula of the inference just above, even it is an atom. X is an atom and this inference is an axiom and consequently X = Y and ? 2 = ; and the inference is !?`G X`X !?; G | X`X Here, we have partially the Prolog mechanism without uni cation because the corresponding rules 8-L and 9-R have been applied.
To obtain uni cation, it is su cient to have a lazy application of these rules where the instantiation of the variables is stopped until the axioms application.
We have proposed a simple example, for which we have knowledge about expressiveness and proof search, but we can apply this analysis method to di erent fragments of linear logic as in 15, 16, 17] , considered as basis for linear logic programming.
Related and further work
This work on proof normalization in linear logic presents similarities and di erences with other works on various fragments of LL, mainly those focusing on extensions of logic programming. The study of permutability properties is signi cant for proof search and theorem proving for non classical logics in general 29]. Shankar has presented in 26] a proof search method for intuitionistic calculus, based on the permutability possibilities, that could be generalized for our purpose. We will investigate this point and the connections with our work. Our aim, here, consists in having a special proof form, called normal form, in the class of equivalent cut-free proofs. In a similar way, Andreoli emphasizes in 2] also a subclass of proofs, called "focusing proofs", which is complete. Let us recall that, in a normal proof, the weaken- whereas in our system we choose immediately !A as principal formula. Tammet in 27] concentrates on problems of automated theorem proving in full linear logic and investigate general search strategies mainly for top-down direction with original proposals for resolution method in CLL. It appears that we might consider our approach to re ne and de ne proof strategies for top-down direction. Keeping full linear logic for the proof normalization process, leads to some limits due to the impossibility to permute some inferences. A way to solve this problem is to consider an adequate CLL fragment to go further than in CLL in the inference movement in a proof and then in the normalization. For example, in a fragment without &, the inferences of type can be moved forward as much as possible as those of type }. Of course, for the choice of the fragment, there is another important criterion to take into account: the ability to express problem speci cations in such a fragment. Both requirements of expressiveness and e ciency can be contradictory and we have to nd the best compromise between these aspects. In this way, we can mention the work of Hodas and Miller 16] and of Harland and Pym 14, 15] . The common objective is to extend the expressiveness capability in logic programming languages using linear logic and to e ciently construct proofs in the logical framework. They consider a two-sided linear sequent calculus without negation rule. But are, in such a framework, our permutability properties still available ? The answer is yes if we made a good translation of it. Then any property of an inference type (for sequents without left-hand side part) is transposed automatically to the corresponding inference type at righthand side and also to the dual inference type at left-hand side (see section 7). It results from the fact that any rule of the sequent calculus without left-hand side part leads to two rules when we consider a sequent calculus with it. Moreover, the connective | , more adequate for logic programming, replaces the connective } but keeps the same properties of inference permutability (in fact A | B A ? }B).
Brie y, we can say that 16] considers two sorts of formulae (as goals and resources) and sequents (as queries) of a speci c CLL fragment. The point is that such sequents can be proved using the notion of uniform proofs: in a bottom-up construction, the right rules are always applied before the left rules. It is the case because, in this fragment of LL, the inferences on right-hand side parts of sequents can be moved down as much as possible in a proof. This point is strongly connected to the previous results. A complete study could be done on the basis of the method proposed in section 7 to understand and justify the limits and the power of the fragment considered. Moreover, a similar study can be done with the approach of Harland and Pym 15].
They have proposed also a fragment of LL chosen so that uniform proofs remain complete but it presents more di culty to treat right-hand sides including !, with di erence of expressiveness in goals and contexts. These works refer to the resolution on CLL fragments which appears as a speci c rule de ned mainly from an analysis of the permutation properties as but with a bottom-up proof direction. Finally, we cannot forget to mention the relationship with the fundamental results about complexity and decidability in LL. Kanovich's works 17] aim to develop a computational interpretation of the logic and to obtain e cient decision algorithms based on a bottom-up approach.
To do it, he considers the Horn fragment of LL from a computational and a logical point of view and then generalizes the approach by introduction of the additives and !. Knowing that the propositional linear logic is not decidable 21], the main conclusions about this complexity analysis is that the multiplicative fragment is NP-complete and the additive multiplicative one is Pspace-complete. The connections between our based-on-permutability logical study and the various related work presented here are to be deeply analyzed with a view to mechanizing proof construction in fragments of linear logic.
Conclusion
We have considered the problem of proof normalization in full linear logic. The solution we propose results from a systematic study of inference permutabilities in this logic framework. An issue of them is the e ective construction of a theorem prover for linear logic in which it is possible to reduce some sources of undeterminism during the proof construction. It would be necessary to consider other tactics or strategies for proof development based in addition on semantical results. Another issue consists in using the analysis on permutability of inferences in designing some logic programming languages in fragments of CLL with a compromise between the expressiveness of the language and the e ciency of the proof construction. This point is strongly connected to recent works on some extensions of logic programming 15, 16] and allows to understand or justify some choices in the language conception. Moreover, from this analysis of proof mechanization in linear logic and the better comprehension of CLL through this proof-theoretic foundation, we could consider the various applications of proof development in linear logic. In addition to logic programming, let us mention the connections with some dynamical problems as planning 22] and with the proofs as programs approach through adequate typed -calculi. In this latter case, a good knowledge about various aspects of proof construction and transformation would be necessary to use the algorithmic contents of proofs to prospect for example typed concurrent programming and program synthesis through program extraction from proofs in this logical framework.
A Proof of permutability theorem
Case by case analysis according to the partition of the inference rules into two groups: those depending on the context, i. Proof B.1 Let I be the unique cut in . By theorem 4.3, there exists a proof 00 , obtained by backward movement of I in , such that for any inference I' resulting from this movement, I' is immediately preceded by two inferences introducing the active formulae of I'. Thus, from de nition 5.3, we have c(I') which is equal to c(I). In fact, the problem is to reduce the complexity of each cut I' considering the subproof 1 of 00 ending with I'.
Hence, 1 has only one cut I' and then c( 1 ) = c(I 0 ) = c( ).
Let us consider such a cut I', with several cases according to the form of the active formulae of I'.
1) The active formulae are atomic or constant. A; A ?
In the case a), it can be replaced by the proof 0 1 `>; ; 0 with c( 0 1 ) = 0 < c( 1 ). In the case b), it can be replaced by the proof 2 which contains no more cut and then c( 2 ) = 0 < c( 1 ). Finally, in case c), it can be replaced by the proof 0 1 `A; A ? which contains no more cut and then c( 0 1 ) = 0 < c( 1 ).
2) The active formulae are of the and } type.
In this case, 1 
